A Deflationary Theory Of Diachronic Identity.
Substantive theories of diachronic identity have been offered for different kinds of entities. The kind of entity whose diachronic identity has received the most attention in the literature is person, where such theories as the psychological theory, the body theory, the soul theory, and animalism ha...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 90; no. 1; pp. 19 - 38 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Mar2012
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=71860703&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 71860703 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2012 vid: 90 iid: 1 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 71860703 10.1080/00048402.2011.556131 ppf: 19 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 141KB tig: atl: A Deflationary Theory Of Diachronic Identity. aug: au: Pruss, AlexanderR. affil: Baylor University su: Identity (Philosophical concept) Deflationary theory of truth Philosophy of time Spacetime Quantity (Philosophy) sug: subj: Identity (Philosophical concept) Deflationary theory of truth Philosophy of time Spacetime Quantity (Philosophy) ab: Substantive theories of diachronic identity have been offered for different kinds of entities. The kind of entity whose diachronic identity has received the most attention in the literature is person, where such theories as the psychological theory, the body theory, the soul theory, and animalism have been defended. At the same time, Wittgenstein's remark that ‘to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all’ suggests that the idea of further analysing identity is mistaken at root. I shall offer a simple, deflationary theory that reduces diachronic identity to quantification, synchronic identity and existence at a spacetime location (or at a time, for non-spatial entities). On logical grounds, the theory is guaranteed to have no counterexamples. Because the theory is guaranteed to have no counterexamples, all the imaginative examples offered as intuitive support for theories of personal identity are going to be either incorrect or compatible with the theory. I shall argue that the deflationary theory is preferable on simplicity grounds to typical substantive theories, and that various problems that are commonly thought to concern diachronic identity are better seen as about something else. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2012 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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