Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games.
In the context of a “beauty-contest” coordination game (in which pay-offs depend on the quadratic distance of actions from an unobserved state variable and from the average action), players choose how much costly attention to pay to various informative signals. Each signal has an underlying accuracy...
| Published in: | Review of Economic Studies Vol. 79; no. 1; pp. 340 - 375 |
|---|---|
| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Oxford University Press / USA
Jan2012
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=72135346&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 72135346 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00346527 REM jtl: Review of Economic Studies issn: 00346527 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2012 vid: 79 iid: 1 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 72135346 10.1093/restud/rdr018 ppf: 340 ppct: 35 formats: tig: atl: Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games. aug: au: Myatt, David P. Wallace, Chris affil: London Business School Department of Economics, University of Leicester su: Economic equilibrium Endogenous growth (Economics) Coordination (Human services) Beauty contests Acquisition of data Linear complementarity problem sug: subj: Economic equilibrium Sports stadiums and other presenters with facilities Promoters of Performing Arts, Sports, and Similar Events with Facilities Endogenous growth (Economics) Coordination (Human services) Beauty contests Acquisition of data Linear complementarity problem keyword: Beauty-contests Coordination games Information acquisition Rational inattention Beauty-contests Coordination games Information acquisition Rational inattention ab: In the context of a “beauty-contest” coordination game (in which pay-offs depend on the quadratic distance of actions from an unobserved state variable and from the average action), players choose how much costly attention to pay to various informative signals. Each signal has an underlying accuracy (how precisely it identifies the state) and a clarity (how easy it is to understand). The unique linear equilibrium has interesting properties: the signals which receive attention are the clearest available, even if they have poor underlying accuracy; the number of signals observed falls as the complementarity of players' actions rises; and, if actions are more complementary, the information endogenously acquired in equilibrium is more public in nature. The consequences of “rational-inattention” constraints on information transmission and processing are also studied. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|