| Sumario: | This guide accompanies the following article(s): Meghan Sullivan, 'Problems with Temporary Existence in Tense Logic'. Philosophy Compass 7/1 (2012): 43-57. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00457.x Author's Introduction Over the past century, there has been considerable debate over whether and how anything changes with respect to existence. Most A-theorists of time (presentists, growing block theorists, and branch theorists) think things come to exist or cease to exist. B-theorists of time (four-dimensionalists, in particular) think objects do not change with respect to existence. In my Compass article, I outline a serious difficulty that A-theorists face in trying to reason about temporary existents. The most straightforward logics for time and existence entail that nothing exists merely temporarily. The problem arises from a set of theorems of the simplest temporal logic - the converse Barcan formulas. But attempts to fix the logic to get rid of the Barcan formulas pressure A-theorists to abandon an intuitive and widespread assumption about existence. I survey the logical and metaphysical options for solving the problem. Author Recommends Burgess, John P. Philosophical Logic. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009. An introductory textbook in philosophical logic. Chapter 2 focuses on temporal logic and motivates a logic-based response to problems with the temporal Barcan schemas. Prior, A. N. Past, Present, and Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967. The first attempt to rigorously formulate propositional and quantified tense logic. Chapter 8 especially provides philosophical insight into problems with change in existence. Prior uses Polish notation for his proofs and formalism, which requires a bit of background to translate. Sider, Theodore. Four-Dimensionalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. Provides a useful background on the debates in the philosophy of time. The first three chapters that precisely define the different theories are especially relevant. Sider, Theodore. Logic for Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. A useful guide to the semantics and proof theory of modal and temporal logics. van Inwagen, Peter. 'Meta-Ontology.' Erkenntnis 48 (1998):233-50. Gives an explanation and defense of neo-Quinean assumptions. Williamson, Timothy. 'Bare Possibilia.' Erkenntnis 48 (1998):257-73. Provides a logic-based argument for necessary, permanent existence and gives an A-theory-friendly model for explaining change on such an ontology. Zimmerman, Dean W. 'Temporary Intrinsics and Presentism.' Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Eds. Peter van Inwagen and Dean W. Zimmerman. Oxford: Blackwell, 1998. Surveys a problem in formulating presentist theories of change and motivates the need for tense operators. Sample Syllabus: Here is a sample syllabus for a course on time in metaphysics and logic: Week I: Introduction: A-Theories and B-Theories We will consider precise ways of differentiating A-theories of time and B-theories of time, looking in particular at how A-theorists and B-theorists think of intrinsic properties. Reading:
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