APPLICATIONS BARRIER TO ENTRY AND EXCLUSIVE VERTICAL CONTRACTS IN PLATFORM MARKETS.
Our study extends the empirical literature on whether vertical restraints are anticompetitive. We focus on exclusive contracting in platform markets, which feature indirect network effects and thus are susceptible to an applications barrier to entry. Exclusive contracts in vertical relationships bet...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 50; no. 2; pp. 435 - 453 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Apr2012
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=74195632&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 74195632 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Apr2012 vid: 50 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 74195632 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2010.00355.x ppf: 435 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 572KB tig: atl: APPLICATIONS BARRIER TO ENTRY AND EXCLUSIVE VERTICAL CONTRACTS IN PLATFORM MARKETS. aug: au: PRIEGER, JAMES E. HU, WEI‐MIN affil: Prieger: Associate Professor of Public Policy, School of Public Policy, Pepperdine University, 24255 Pacific Coast Highway, Malibu, CA 90263‐7490. Phone (310) 506‐710, Fax (310) 506‐7494, E‐mail Hu: Assistant Professor, School of Economics, Hanqing Advance Institute of Economic and Finance, Renmin University of China, No. 59, Zongguancun Street, Beijing 100872, China. Phone 86‐10‐62514921, Fax 86‐10‐62511343, E‐mail su: Market entry Unfair competition Barriers to entry (Industrial organization) Restraint of trade Video game industry Bargaining power Industrial concentration sug: subj: Market entry Unfair competition Video game design and development services Home entertainment equipment merchant wholesalers Doll, Toy, and Game Manufacturing Video game publishers Barriers to entry (Industrial organization) Restraint of trade Video game industry Bargaining power Industrial concentration ab: Our study extends the empirical literature on whether vertical restraints are anticompetitive. We focus on exclusive contracting in platform markets, which feature indirect network effects and thus are susceptible to an applications barrier to entry. Exclusive contracts in vertical relationships between the platform provider and software supplier can heighten entry barriers. We test these theories in the home video game market. We find that indirect network effects from software on hardware demand are present, and that exclusivity takes market share from rivals, but only when most games are nonexclusive. The marginal exclusive game contributes virtually nothing to console demand. Thus, allowing exclusive vertical contracts in platform markets need not lead to domination by one system protected by a hedge of complementary software. Our investigation suggests that bargaining power enjoyed by the best software providers and the skewed distribution of game revenue prevents the foreclosure of rivals through exclusive contracting. ( JEL L42, L63, D12) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|