Confining 'Disenhanced' Animals.

Drawing upon evolutionary theory and the work of Daniel Dennett and Nicholas Agar, I offer an argument for broadening discussion of the ethics of disenhancement beyond animal welfare concerns to a consideration of animal 'biopreferences'. Short of rendering animals completely unconscious or decerebr...

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Publicado en:NanoEthics Vol. 6; no. 1; pp. 41 - 47
Autor principal: Hadley, John
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2012
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Dennett, Daniel Clement, 1942-
        Agar, Nicholas
        Animal rights
        Animal welfare
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          Dennett, Daniel Clement, 1942-
          Agar, Nicholas
          Animal rights
          Animal welfare
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        Agar
        Animal ethics
        Animal Welfare
        Biocentrism
        Confinement
        Dennett
        Disenhancement
        Folk psychology
      ab: Drawing upon evolutionary theory and the work of Daniel Dennett and Nicholas Agar, I offer an argument for broadening discussion of the ethics of disenhancement beyond animal welfare concerns to a consideration of animal 'biopreferences'. Short of rendering animals completely unconscious or decerebrate, it is reasonable to suggest that disenhanced animals will continue to have some preferences. To the extent that these preferences can be understood as what Agar refers to as 'plausible naturalizations' for familiar moral concepts like beliefs and desires, then they can make moral claims on us and provide support for intuitive opposition to disenhancement.
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