KITCHER'S NATURALISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF MATHEMATICS.
With his book The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge (1983), Ph. Kitcher, that had been doing extensive research in the history of the subject and in the contemporary debates on epistemology, saw clearly the need for a change in philosophy of mathematics. His goal was to replace the dominant, aprioris...
| Publicado en: | Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences & the Humanities Vol. 101; pp. 295 - 327 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Brill / Rodopi
2011
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=74990561&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 74990561 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 03038157 8X79 jtl: Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences & the Humanities issn: 03038157 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: @attributes: year: 2011 month: 08 day: 01 vid: 101 pid: 15461 pub: Brill / Rodopi artinfo: ui: 74990561 ppf: 295 ppct: 32 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 241KB tig: atl: KITCHER'S NATURALISTIC EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF MATHEMATICS. aug: au: Alcolea, Jesús affil: Universitat de València Faculty of Philosophy and Education Sciences Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science Avda. Blasco Ibáñez 30 46010-Valencia Spain su: Kitcher, Philip, 1947- Naturalism Philosophy of mathematics Logic Rationalism sug: subj: Kitcher, Philip, 1947- Naturalism Philosophy of mathematics Logic Rationalism ab: With his book The Nature of Mathematical Knowledge (1983), Ph. Kitcher, that had been doing extensive research in the history of the subject and in the contemporary debates on epistemology, saw clearly the need for a change in philosophy of mathematics. His goal was to replace the dominant, apriorist philosophy of mathematics with an empiricist philosophy. The current philosophies of mathematics all appeared, according to his analysis, not to fit well with how mathematicians actually do mathematics. A shift in orientation should invoke the more general reflection that causal, genetic factors are as significant for epistemology as logical structure. As I am to a large extent sympathetic with Kitcher's proposal, my aims here will be simple: first I start presenting Kitcher's argument, and then I try to raise some doubts about his contribution. These doubts come probably from my unskilfulness to follow the torrential flow of Kitcher's ideas. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences & the Humanities is the property of Brill / Rodopi and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences & the Humanities holder: Brill / Rodopi dt: @attributes: year: 2011 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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