THE CATEGORY OF "APPLIED SCIENCE" AN ANALYSIS OF ITS JUSTIFICATION FROM "INFORMATION SCIENCE" AS DESIGN SCIENCE.

This paper addresses the problem of the distinction between basic science and applied science. It also explores their differences with regard to technology. For this analysis, as well as a general epistemological and methodological approach, we study a particular case: information science. As the em...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences & the Humanities Vol. 101; pp. 327 - 351
Autor principal: Bereijo, Antonio
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Brill / Rodopi 2011
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Descripción
Sumario:This paper addresses the problem of the distinction between basic science and applied science. It also explores their differences with regard to technology. For this analysis, as well as a general epistemological and methodological approach, we study a particular case: information science. As the emphasis of the paper is on the category of applied science, it includes a critical analysis of Philip Kitcher's proposal. First, there is an examination of Ph. Kitcher's thought, because he has addressed this issue without offering a clear distinction between the various categories. I then consider the contributions of I. Niiniluoto, which determine in a more genuine way the features that distinguish applied science from basic science. Here, I focus on the ideas of H.A Simon on the science of design, to the extent that it is an applied science. This then allows us to shed light on the disciplinary field of information science, which is characterized as an applied science of design. This is a case that shows the need to distinguish three epistemological and methodological domains: basic science, applied science and technology.