Turing, Searle, and the Wizard of Oz: Life and Custom Among the Automata or How Ought We to Assess the Attribution of Capacities of Living Systems to Technological Artefacts?
Since the middle of the 20 century there has been a significant debate about the attribution of capacities of living systems, particularly humans, to technological artefacts, especially computers --from Turing's opening gambit, to subsequent considerations of artificial intelligence, to recent claim...
| Publicado en: | Techné: Research in Philosophy & Technology Vol. 14; no. 2; pp. 88 - 103 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Philosophy Documentation Center
Spring2010
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=75350562&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 75350562 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01617249 2Y0N jtl: Techné: Research in Philosophy & Technology issn: 01617249 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Spring2010 vid: 14 iid: 2 pid: 2411 pub: Philosophy Documentation Center artinfo: ui: 75350562 ppf: 88 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1.5MB tig: atl: Turing, Searle, and the Wizard of Oz: Life and Custom Among the Automata or How Ought We to Assess the Attribution of Capacities of Living Systems to Technological Artefacts? aug: au: Cook, S. D. Noam affil: San José State University su: Machine theory Attribution (Social psychology) Artificial intelligence Artificial life Technology Ethics Living systems theory sug: subj: Machine theory Attribution (Social psychology) Artificial intelligence Artificial life Technology Ethics Living systems theory keyword: AI Debate Artificial Intelligence Debate Chinese Room Turing Test ab: Since the middle of the 20 century there has been a significant debate about the attribution of capacities of living systems, particularly humans, to technological artefacts, especially computers --from Turing's opening gambit, to subsequent considerations of artificial intelligence, to recent claims about artificial life. Some now argue that the capacities of future technologies will ultimately make it impossible to draw any meaningful distinctions between humans and machines. Such issues center on what sense, if any, it makes to claim that gadgets can actually think, feel, act, live, etc. I outline this debate and offer a critique of its persistent polarization. I characterize two of the debate's major camps (associated roughly with Turing and Searle); argue that the debate's structure (including key assumptions inherent to each camp) precludes resolution; and, contend that some central clashes within the debate actually stem from an inadequately drawn distinction between claims about the capacities of artifacts and claims about the proper criteria for assessing such attributions. I offer a different perspective in which I: challenge some central elements of the debate that contribute to its perennially irresolvable state; hold that the debate needs to be placed more squarely in sync with how we in fact treat the attribution of such capacities to humans themselves; and, offer (unlike the other two camps) a foothold for making moral assessments of such proposed technologies. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Techné: Research in Philosophy & Technology is the property of Philosophy Documentation Center and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Techné: Research in Philosophy & Technology holder: Philosophy Documentation Center dt: @attributes: year: 2010 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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