Can the new indispensability argument be saved from Euclidean rescues?
The traditional formulation of the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical entities (IA) has been criticised due to its reliance on confirmational holism. Recently a formulation of IA that works without appeal to confirmational holism has been defended. This recent formulation is...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 187; no. 2; pp. 489 - 509 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jul2012
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=78217469&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 78217469 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2012 vid: 187 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 78217469 10.1007/s11229-010-9848-6 ppf: 489 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 200KB tig: atl: Can the new indispensability argument be saved from Euclidean rescues? aug: au: Busch, Jacob affil: Institut for filosofi og Idéhistorie, Aarhus Universitet, Jens Chr Skous Vej 7 8000 Aarhus C Denmark su: Euclidean algorithm Holism Virtue Falsification Mathematics research sug: subj: Euclidean algorithm Holism Virtue Falsification Mathematics research ab: The traditional formulation of the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical entities (IA) has been criticised due to its reliance on confirmational holism. Recently a formulation of IA that works without appeal to confirmational holism has been defended. This recent formulation is meant to be superior to the traditional formulation in virtue of it not being subject to the kind of criticism that pertains to confirmational holism. I shall argue that a proponent of the version of IA that works without appeal to confirmational holism will struggle to answer a challenge readily answered by proponents of a version of IA that does appeal to confirmational holism. This challenge is to explain why mathematics applied in falsified scientific theories is not considered to be falsified along with the rest of the theory. In cases where mathematics seemingly ought to be falsified it is saved from falsification, by a so called 'Euclidean rescue'. I consider a range of possible answers to this challenge and conclude that each answer fails. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2012. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2012 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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