Intractability and the use of heuristics in psychological explanations.
Many cognitive scientists, having discovered that some computational-level characterization f of a cognitive capacity $${\phi}$$ is intractable, invoke heuristics as algorithmic-level explanations of how cognizers compute f. We argue that such explanations are actually dysfunctional, and rebut five...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 187; no. 2; pp. 471 - 488 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Jul2012
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Many cognitive scientists, having discovered that some computational-level characterization f of a cognitive capacity $${\phi}$$ is intractable, invoke heuristics as algorithmic-level explanations of how cognizers compute f. We argue that such explanations are actually dysfunctional, and rebut five possible objections. We then propose computational-level theory revision as a principled and workable alternative. |
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