'The Experience of Left and Right' Meets the Physics of Left and Right.
I consider an argument, due to Geoffrey Lee, that we can know a priori from the left-right asymmetrical character of experience that our brains are left-right asymmetrical. Lee's argument assumes a premise he calls relationism, which I show is well-supported by the best philosophical picture of s...
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 46; no. 3; pp. 483 - 499 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2012
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=78333973&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 78333973 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2012 vid: 46 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 78333973 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2010.00814.x ppf: 483 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 598KB tig: atl: 'The Experience of Left and Right' Meets the Physics of Left and Right. aug: au: John Baker, David affil: University of Michigan su: Lee, Geoffrey Relationism Other minds (Theory of knowledge) Philosophy of physics Ethical absolutism sug: subj: Lee, Geoffrey Relationism Other minds (Theory of knowledge) Philosophy of physics Ethical absolutism ab: I consider an argument, due to Geoffrey Lee, that we can know a priori from the left-right asymmetrical character of experience that our brains are left-right asymmetrical. Lee's argument assumes a premise he calls relationism, which I show is well-supported by the best philosophical picture of spacetime. I explain why Lee's relationism is compatible with left-right asymmetrical laws. I then show that the conclusion of Lee's argument is not as strong or surprising as he makes it out to be. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2012 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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