The Trials of Life: Natural Selection and Random Drift.

We distinguish dynamical and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. We argue that only the statistical interpretation preserves the presumed relation between natural selection and drift. On these grounds we claim that the dynamical conception of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 69; no. 3; pp. 452 - 474
Autores principales: Walsh, Denis M., Lewens, Tim, Ariew, Andre
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Sep2002
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: The Trials of Life: Natural Selection and Random Drift.
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          Walsh, Denis M.
          Lewens, Tim
          Ariew, Andre
      su:
        Biological evolution
        Natural selection
        Philosophy of science
      sug:
        subj:
          Biological evolution
          Natural selection
          Philosophy of science
      ab: We distinguish dynamical and statistical interpretations of evolutionary theory. We argue that only the statistical interpretation preserves the presumed relation between natural selection and drift. On these grounds we claim that the dynamical conception of evolutionary theory as a theory of forces is mistaken. Selection and drift are not forces. Nor do selection and drift explanations appeal to the (sub-population-level) causes of population level change. Instead they explain by appeal to the statistical structure of populations. We briefly discuss the implications of the statistical interpretation of selection for various debates within the philosophy of biology—the 'explananda of selection' debate and the 'units of selection' debate.
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    language: English
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