Lying with Conditionals Lying with Conditionals.
If you read this abstract, then you will understand what my essay is about. Under what conditions would the preceding assertion be a lie? Traditional definitions of lying are always applied to straight declaratives such as 'The dog ate my homework'. This one sided diet of examples leaves us unprepar...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 62; no. 249; pp. 820 - 833 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Oxford University Press / USA
Oct2012
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=79615737&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 79615737 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318094 PHQ jtl: Philosophical Quarterly issn: 00318094 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2012 vid: 62 iid: 249 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 79615737 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2012.00080.x ppf: 820 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 74KB tig: atl: Lying with Conditionals Lying with Conditionals. aug: au: Sorensen, Roy affil: Washington University in St. Louis su: Truthfulness & falsehood Explicit memory Probability theory Jackson, Frank Virtues sug: subj: Truthfulness & falsehood Explicit memory Probability theory Jackson, Frank Virtues ab: If you read this abstract, then you will understand what my essay is about. Under what conditions would the preceding assertion be a lie? Traditional definitions of lying are always applied to straight declaratives such as 'The dog ate my homework'. This one sided diet of examples leaves us unprepared for sentences in which conditional probability governs assertibility. The truth-value of conditionals does not play a significant role in the sincere assertion of conditionals. Lying is insincere assertion. So the connection between lying and falsehood is broken when lying with conditionals. Drawing on Frank Jackson's account of indicative conditionals. I argue that it is possible to lie with true conditionals by virtue of their false conventional implicatures. False conversational implicatures only guarantee misleading assertions, not lies. Lying remains a semantic rather than a pragmatic affair. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews. item: Philosophical Quarterly holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2012 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|