Estlund on Epistocracy: A Critique.
An influential anti-democratic argument says: '(1) Answers to political questions are truth-apt. (2) A small elite only-the epistocrats-knows these truths. (3) If answers to political questions are truth-apt, then those with this knowledge about these matters should rule. (4) Thus, epistocrats shoul...
| Publicado en: | Res Publica (13564765) Vol. 18; no. 3; pp. 241 - 259 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Aug2012
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=79824246&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 79824246 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13564765 NMV jtl: Res Publica (13564765) issn: 13564765 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2012 vid: 18 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 79824246 10.1007/s11158-012-9179-1 ppf: 241 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 188KB tig: atl: Estlund on Epistocracy: A Critique. aug: au: Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper affil: Institut for Statskundskab, Aarhus Universitet, Bartholins Allé 7 8000 Aarhus Denmark su: Theory of knowledge Estlund, David Democrats (United States) Justification (Theory of knowledge) Political knowledge Plural voting sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Estlund, David Democrats (United States) Justification (Theory of knowledge) Political knowledge Plural voting keyword: Authority Democracy Epistocracy Estlund Political justification ab: An influential anti-democratic argument says: '(1) Answers to political questions are truth-apt. (2) A small elite only-the epistocrats-knows these truths. (3) If answers to political questions are truth-apt, then those with this knowledge about these matters should rule. (4) Thus, epistocrats should rule.' Many democrats have responded by denying (1), arguing that, say, answers to political questions are a matter of sheer personal preference. Others have rejected (2), contending that knowledge of the true answers to political questions is evenly distributed. David Estlund finds neither of these replies conclusive. Instead, he attacks (3) arguing that there can be no agreement between qualified people as to who the epistocrats are and that people are not subject to being ruled by experts, whose status as such they can reasonably dispute. Critically, I argue that this argument does not block all forms of epistocratic argument and that Estlund fails to consider the full range of plausible epistocratic views. More constructively, I offer a modest argument for why greater expertise does not necessarily warrant greater political authority. Presumably, the set of feasible options might differ, depending on what procedure is used, and a sub-optimal choice by nonepistocrats from a better set might be superior to the optimal choice by epistocrats from a worse set. In such cases, the mere fact of greater expertise does not warrant political authority, i.e., (3) is false. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Res Publica (13564765) is a copyright of Springer, 2012. All Rights Reserved. item: Res Publica (13564765) holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2012 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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