The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard.
We use theory and field data to study the draft mechanism used to allocate courses at Harvard Business School. We show that the draft is manipulable in theory, manipulated in practice, and that these manipulations cause significant welfare loss. Nevertheless, we find that welfare is higher than unde...
| Published in: | American Economic Review Vol. 102; no. 5; pp. 2237 - 2272 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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American Economic Association
Aug2012
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=82237623&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 82237623 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00028282 AER jtl: American Economic Review issn: 00028282 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2012 vid: 102 iid: 5 pid: 22 pub: American Economic Association artinfo: ui: 82237623 10.1257/aer.102.5.2237 ppf: 2237 ppct: 35 formats: tig: atl: The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard. aug: au: Budish, Eric Cantillon, Estelle affil: a1 a2 su: Harvard Business School Manipulative behavior Assignment problems (Programming) Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Operations research Pareto optimum Allocative efficiency (Economics) Business school administration sug: subj: Manipulative behavior Harvard Business School Process, Physical Distribution, and Logistics Consulting Services Colleges, Universities, and Professional Schools Business and Secretarial Schools Assignment problems (Programming) Resource allocation -- Mathematical models Operations research Pareto optimum Allocative efficiency (Economics) Business school administration ab: We use theory and field data to study the draft mechanism used to allocate courses at Harvard Business School. We show that the draft is manipulable in theory, manipulated in practice, and that these manipulations cause significant welfare loss. Nevertheless, we find that welfare is higher than under its widely studied strategyproof alternative. We identify a new link between fairness and welfare that explains why the draft performs well despite the costs of strategic behavior, and then design a new draft that reduces these costs. We draw several broader lessons for market design, regarding Pareto efficiency, fairness, and strategyproofness. (JEL D63, D82, I23) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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