Truthmaking without necessitation.

I propose an account truthmaking that provides truthmakers for negative truths. The account replaces Truthmaker Necessitarianism with a 'Duplication Principle', according to which a suitable entity T is a truthmaker for a proposition p just in case the existence of an appropriate counterpart of T en...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 189; no. 1; pp. 11 - 29
Autor principal: Briggs, Rachael
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Nov2012
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Briggs, Rachael
        affil: School of Philosophy, The Australian National University, Canberra Australia
      su:
        Truth
        Necessity (Philosophy)
        Disjunction (Logic)
        Armstrong, David
        Entailment (Logic)
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        subj:
          Truth
          Necessity (Philosophy)
          Disjunction (Logic)
          Armstrong, David
          Entailment (Logic)
      keyword:
        Counterpart theory
        Intrinsic properties
        Necessitation
        Truthmakers
        Truthmaking
      ab: I propose an account truthmaking that provides truthmakers for negative truths. The account replaces Truthmaker Necessitarianism with a 'Duplication Principle', according to which a suitable entity T is a truthmaker for a proposition p just in case the existence of an appropriate counterpart of T entails the truth of p, where the counterpart relation is cashed out in terms of qualitative duplication. My account captures an intuitive notion of truthmakers as 'things the way they are', validates two appealing principles about entailment and containment proposed by David Armstrong, and invalidates the controversial Disjunction Thesis.
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    language: English
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