Sarcasm, Pretense, and The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction* Sarcasm, Pretense, and The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction.

Traditional theories of sarcasm treat it as a case of a speaker's meaning the opposite of what she says. Recently, 'expressivists' have argued that sarcasm is not a type of speaker meaning at all, but merely the expression of a dissociative attitude toward an evoked thought or perspective. I argue t...

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Publicado en:Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 46; no. 4; pp. 587 - 635
Autor principal: Camp, Elisabeth
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Dec2012
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Sarcasm, Pretense, and The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction* Sarcasm, Pretense, and The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction.
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        Sarcasm
        Semantics
        Expressivism (Ethics)
        Expression (Philosophy)
        Dissociation (Psychology)
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          Sarcasm
          Semantics
          Expressivism (Ethics)
          Expression (Philosophy)
          Dissociation (Psychology)
      ab: Traditional theories of sarcasm treat it as a case of a speaker's meaning the opposite of what she says. Recently, 'expressivists' have argued that sarcasm is not a type of speaker meaning at all, but merely the expression of a dissociative attitude toward an evoked thought or perspective. I argue that we should analyze sarcasm in terms of meaning inversion, as the traditional theory does; but that we need to construe 'meaning' more broadly, to include illocutionary force and evaluative attitudes as well as propositional content. I distinguish four subclasses of sarcasm, individuated in terms of the target of inversion. Three of these classes raise serious challenges for a standard implicature analysis.
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