THE CONSEQUENCES OF (DE)REGULATION ON EMPLOYMENT DURATION AND EFFICIENCY: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY.
If the future market wage is uncertain, engaging in long-term employment is risky, with the risk depending on how regulated the labor market is. In our experiment long-term employment can result either from offering long-term contracts or from repeatedly and mutually opting for rematching. Treatment...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 51; no. 1; pp. 1050 - 1066 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2013
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=83710996&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 83710996 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jan2013 vid: 51 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 83710996 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2011.00436.x ppf: 1050 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 866KB tig: atl: THE CONSEQUENCES OF (DE)REGULATION ON EMPLOYMENT DURATION AND EFFICIENCY: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY. aug: au: BERNINGHAUS, SIEGFRIED BLEICH, SABRINA GÜTH, WERNER affil: Berninghaus: Institute of Economic Theory and Statistics, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, 76131 Karlsruhe, Germany. Phone 49 721 608 43380, Fax 49 721 608 43491, E ‐ mail Bleich: Institute of Economic Theory and Statistics, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, 76131 Karlsruhe, Germany. Phone 49 721 608 46134, Fax 49 721 608 43491, E ‐ mail Güth: Max Planck Institute of Economics, Kahlaische Strasse 10, 07745 JENa, Germany. Phone 49 3641 686 620, Fax 49 3641 686 623, E ‐ mail su: Universität Karlsruhe Employment policy Labor market Wages Income Economics Government regulation & economics Long-term employees Labor contracts Experiments sug: subj: Employment policy Labor market Wages Income Economics Universität Karlsruhe Government regulation & economics Long-term employees Labor contracts Experiments ab: If the future market wage is uncertain, engaging in long-term employment is risky, with the risk depending on how regulated the labor market is. In our experiment long-term employment can result either from offering long-term contracts or from repeatedly and mutually opting for rematching. Treatments differ in how regulations restrict the employer's flexibility in adapting the employment contract. All treatments allow for longer contract duration as well as for mutually opting to be rematched. Effort is chosen by employees after a contract is concluded. Treatments vary from no contract flexibility to no restriction at all. Will more (downward) flexibility be used in ongoing employment but reduce labor market efficiency? And will regulation crowd out long-term employment, in the form of long-term contracts or voluntary rematching? pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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