Proper bootstrapping.

According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easy to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that this argument relies on a type of reasoning that is rejectable on independent grounds. We argue that the blanket rejection that Weisberg recommends...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 190; no. 1; pp. 171 - 186
Autores principales: Douven, Igor, Kelp, Christoph
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Jan2013
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Proper bootstrapping.
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          Douven, Igor
          Kelp, Christoph
        affil:
          Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen, Groningen The Netherlands
          Institute of Philosophy, University of Leuven, Leuven Belgium
      su:
        Confirmation (Logic)
        Theory of knowledge
        Reasoning
        Judgment (Logic)
        Philosophy of science
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          Confirmation (Logic)
          Theory of knowledge
          Reasoning
          Judgment (Logic)
          Philosophy of science
      keyword:
        Bootstrapping
        Confirmation theory
        Easy knowledge
      ab: According to a much discussed argument, reliabilism is defective for making knowledge too easy to come by. In a recent paper, Weisberg aims to show that this argument relies on a type of reasoning that is rejectable on independent grounds. We argue that the blanket rejection that Weisberg recommends of this type of reasoning is both unwarranted and unwelcome. Drawing on an older discussion in the philosophy of science, we show that placing some relatively modest restrictions on the said type of reasoning suffices to block the anti-reliabilist argument.
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    language: English
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