RATIONALITY: NORMAL MENTAL FUNCTIONING OR PSYCHOLOGICAL COHERENCE?

A version of the rationalist internalist argument, employing a pro tanto reading of the term "normative reason", is often criticized due to its conception of rationality. It is said that the condition of rationality is insufficient to secure the necessary relation between the moral judgement and the...

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Publicado en:Problems / Problemos Vol. 82; pp. 99 - 112
Autor principal: Vasilionytė, Ieva
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Vilnius University 2012
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Vasilionytė, Ieva
        affil: Vilnius University, Department of Logic and History of Philosophy, Universiteto g. 9/1, LT-01513 Vilnius
      su:
        Thought & thinking
        Reason
        Criticism
        Coherence (Philosophy)
        Motivation (Psychology)
        Externalism (Philosophy of mind)
        Hypothesis
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        subj:
          Thought & thinking
          Reason
          Criticism
          Coherence (Philosophy)
          Motivation (Psychology)
          Externalism (Philosophy of mind)
          Hypothesis
      keyword:
        coherence
        full rationality
        koherentiškumas
        pro tanto normative reason
        pro tanto normatyvus pagrindas
        racionalistinis internalizmas
        racionalumas
        rationalist internalism
        visiškas racionalumas
        koherentiškumas
        pro tanto normatyvus pagrindas
        racionalistinis internalizmas
        racionalumas
        visiškas racionalumas
      ab:
        A version of the rationalist internalist argument, employing a pro tanto reading of the term "normative reason", is often criticized due to its conception of rationality. It is said that the condition of rationality is insufficient to secure the necessary relation between the moral judgement and the respective motivation to act. I claim that such a criticism is based on the false supposition that rationality is to be identified with normal mental functioning. It is shown that for the rationalist internalists rationality does and should rather amount to inner psychological coherence, and that the respective conception of irrationality can account for all the purported counterexamples to the motivational internalism. In addition, I pinpoint that "full rationality" is neither an intuitive notion nor a necessary condition for the rationalist internalism to hold, therefore, a line of criticism employing the notion misses the target.
        Racionalistinio internalizmo argumento versija, normatyvaus pagrindo terminą vartojanti pro tanto reikšme, neretai kritikuojama nusitaikius į jos racionalumo sampratą. Teigiama, kad veikėjo racionalumo sąlyga nėra pakankama būtinam ryšiui tarp moralinio sprendinio arba normatyvaus pagrindo bei atitinkamos motyvacijos veiksmui užtikrinti. Straipsnyje teigiama, kad tokia kritika remiasi klaidinga prielaida, jog racionalumas tapatintinas su normaliu psichiniu funkcionavimu. Parodoma, kad racionalistiniams internalistams racionalumas yra ir turėtų būti tapatintinas veikiau su vidiniu veikėjo psichologijos koherentiškumu, o atitinkama iracionalumo samprata pajėgi apimti visus motyvaciniam internalizmui tariamai prieštaraujančius atvejus. Taip pat patikslinama, jog „visiškas racionalumas“ nėra nei intuityvi sąvoka, nei būtina sąlyga racionalistinio internalizmo teisingumui, todėl kritika, besiremianti šia sąvoka, nepasiekia tikslo.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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      custom: Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
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