Color constancy and dispositionalism.
This article attempts to do two things. The first is to make it plausible that any adequate dispositional view of color will have to associate colors with complex functions from a wide range of normal circumstances to a wide range of (simultaneously) incompatible color appearances, so that there wil...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 162; no. 2; pp. 183 - 201 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jan2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=84579272&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 84579272 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2013 vid: 162 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 84579272 10.1007/s11098-011-9754-x ppf: 183 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 197KB tig: atl: Color constancy and dispositionalism. aug: au: Gert, Joshua affil: Department of Philosophy, College of William and Mary, Williamsburg 23187-8795 USA su: Constancy Perception (Philosophy) Appearance (Philosophy) Disposition (Philosophy) Color vision sug: subj: Constancy Perception (Philosophy) Appearance (Philosophy) Disposition (Philosophy) Color vision keyword: Appearance Aspects Circularity Color Dispositionalism Perception Response-dependence ab: This article attempts to do two things. The first is to make it plausible that any adequate dispositional view of color will have to associate colors with complex functions from a wide range of normal circumstances to a wide range of (simultaneously) incompatible color appearances, so that there will be no uniquely veridical appearance of any given color. The second is to show that once this move is made, dispositionalism is in a position to provide interesting answers to some of the most challenging objections that have been pressed against it. It explains why colors do not seem to 'come on' when the lights come on, and why the right thing to say seems to be that the light causes the objects to reveal their colors. It explains why the content of visual experience need not be problematically circular. It eliminates the problem of intrapersonal variation in color appearance. And it even provides resources for dealing with the problem of interpersonal variation. It is true that in moving to the more complex view, the dispositionalist becomes subject to a new objection, which has been called 'the problem of unity.' The paper offers a solution to this problem as well. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2013. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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