How Norms Can Generate Conflict: An Experiment on the Failure of Cooperative Micro-motives on the Macro-level.
Why does the adherence to norms not prevent conflict? While the current literature focuses on the emergence, maintenance and impact of norms with regard to cooperation, the issue of norm-related conflict deserves more attention. We develop a general game theoretical model of “normative conflict” and...
| Publicado en: | Social Forces Vol. 90; no. 3; pp. 919 - 947 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Mar2012
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=84670259&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 84670259 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00377732 SFR jtl: Social Forces issn: 00377732 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2012 vid: 90 iid: 3 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 84670259 10.1093/sf/sor028 ppf: 919 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1.3MB tig: atl: How Norms Can Generate Conflict: An Experiment on the Failure of Cooperative Micro-motives on the Macro-level. aug: au: Winter, Fabian Rauhut, Heiko Helbing, Dirk affil: Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland su: Social norms Social conflict Game theory Self-interest Human behavior Social cohesion sug: subj: Social norms Social conflict Game theory Self-interest Human behavior Social cohesion ab: Why does the adherence to norms not prevent conflict? While the current literature focuses on the emergence, maintenance and impact of norms with regard to cooperation, the issue of norm-related conflict deserves more attention. We develop a general game theoretical model of “normative conflict” and explain how transaction failures on the macrolevel can result from cooperative motives on the microlevel. We differentiate between two kinds of conflict. The first results from distinct expectations regarding the way in which general normative obligations should be fulfilled, the second from distinct expectations as to how the norm should restrain actions based on self-interest. We demonstrate the empirical relevance of normative conflict in a version of the ultimatum game. Our data reveal widespread normative conflict among different types of actors – egoistic, equity, equality and cherry picker. Our findings demonstrate how cooperative intentions about how to divide a collectively produced good may fail to produce cooperative outcomes. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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