THE DETERMINANTS OF STATE-LEVEL CAPS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES: THEORY AND EVIDENCE.
Under the standard economic model of torts, punitive damages correct for imperfect detection. Incorporating litigation costs into the model provides a justification for punitive damage caps. At the optimum, caps balance deterrence against the cost of litigation. Empirical testing of the model is per...
| Publicado en: | Contemporary Economic Policy Vol. 31; no. 1; pp. 110 - 126 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=84943609&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 84943609 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 10743529 CEY jtl: Contemporary Economic Policy issn: 10743529 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jan2013 vid: 31 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 84943609 10.1111/j.1465-7287.2011.00297.x ppf: 110 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 683KB tig: atl: THE DETERMINANTS OF STATE-LEVEL CAPS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES: THEORY AND EVIDENCE. aug: au: MICELI, THOMAS J. STONE, MICHAEL P. affil: Miceli: Professor, Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT. Phone (860) 486‐5810, Fax (860) 486‐4463, E‐mail. Stone: Visiting Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Quinnipiac University, Hamden, CT. Phone (203) 582‐3941, Fax (203) 582‐8664, E‐mail su: Economic models Empirical research Legal services Ideology Exemplary damages Proportional hazards models Legal costs sug: subj: Economic models Empirical research Legal services Ideology All Other Legal Services Exemplary damages Proportional hazards models Legal costs ab: Under the standard economic model of torts, punitive damages correct for imperfect detection. Incorporating litigation costs into the model provides a justification for punitive damage caps. At the optimum, caps balance deterrence against the cost of litigation. Empirical testing of the model is performed via Cox proportional and parametric hazard analyses, using a panel dataset from 1981 to 2007. The results reveal a positive relationship between legal services employment (a proxy for legal costs) and cap enactment, and a negative relationship between state gross state product (a proxy for damages) and cap enactment. Cap enactment is also influenced by political ideology. ( JEL K13, K41, L51) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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