Endogenous asymmetry in a dynamic procurement auction.
We show how to numerically solve for a Markov-perfect equilibrium of a dynamic auction game where a procurer repeatedly purchases construction services from capacity-constrained firms. We find that the procurer is best off scheduling frequent auctions for small project sizes. Otherwise, firm capacit...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 43; no. 4; pp. 726 - 761 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Winter2012
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=85040382&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 85040382 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Winter2012 vid: 43 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 85040382 10.1111/1756-2171.12006 ppf: 726 ppct: 35 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1.2MB tig: atl: Endogenous asymmetry in a dynamic procurement auction. aug: au: Saini, Viplav affil: Oberlin College; . su: Economic equilibrium Business enterprises Economic competition Auctions Industrial capacity Numerical analysis sug: subj: Economic equilibrium Business enterprises Economic competition Auctions Industrial capacity Numerical analysis ab: We show how to numerically solve for a Markov-perfect equilibrium of a dynamic auction game where a procurer repeatedly purchases construction services from capacity-constrained firms. We find that the procurer is best off scheduling frequent auctions for small project sizes. Otherwise, firm capacity utilization rates become larger and more asymmetric, which softens competition and increases procurement costs. We also find that forward-looking bidding dampens the competition-softening effects of asymmetry: farsighted firms compete more intensely than myopic ones. This can undermine the goal of a bid-preference-style affirmative action program: more farsighted firms respond less to the asymmetry induced via bid preferences. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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