Who Should Be Afraid of the Jeffreys-Lindley Paradox?
The article revisits the large n (sample size) problem as it relates to the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox to compare the frequentist, Bayesian, and likelihoodist approaches to inference and evidence. It is argued that what is fallacious is to interpret a rejection of H as providing the same evidence for...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 80; no. 1; pp. 73 - 94 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jan2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=85691597&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 85691597 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2013 vid: 80 iid: 1 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 85691597 10.1086/668875 ppf: 73 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 11.2MB tig: atl: Who Should Be Afraid of the Jeffreys-Lindley Paradox? aug: au: Spanos, Aris su: Paradox Bayesian analysis Logical fallacies Reasoning Logic sug: subj: Paradox Bayesian analysis Logical fallacies Reasoning Logic ab: The article revisits the large n (sample size) problem as it relates to the Jeffreys-Lindley paradox to compare the frequentist, Bayesian, and likelihoodist approaches to inference and evidence. It is argued that what is fallacious is to interpret a rejection of H as providing the same evidence for a particular alternative H irrespective of n; this is an example of the fallacy of rejection. Moreover, the Bayesian and likelihoodist approaches are shown to be susceptible to the fallacy of acceptance. The key difference is that in frequentist testing the severity evaluation circumvents both fallacies but no such principled remedy exists for the other approaches. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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