Epistemic Focal Bias.
This paper defends strict invariantism against some philosophical and empirical data that have been taken to compromise it. The defence involves a combination of a priori philosophical arguments and empirically informed theorizing. The positive account of the data is an epistemic focal bias account...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 91; no. 1; pp. 41 - 62 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Taylor & Francis Ltd
Mar2013
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=85901466&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 85901466 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2013 vid: 91 iid: 1 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 85901466 10.1080/00048402.2011.631020 ppf: 41 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 369KB tig: atl: Epistemic Focal Bias. aug: au: Gerken, Mikkel affil: University of Copenhagen su: Cognitive psychology Theory of knowledge Philosophy of language Semantics (Philosophy) Pragmatism sug: subj: Cognitive psychology Theory of knowledge Philosophy of language Semantics (Philosophy) Pragmatism keyword: cognitive psychology contrastivism focal bias knowledge ascriptions strict invariantism ab: This paper defends strict invariantism against some philosophical and empirical data that have been taken to compromise it. The defence involves a combination of a priori philosophical arguments and empirically informed theorizing. The positive account of the data is an epistemic focal bias account that draws on cognitive psychology. It involves the assumption that, owing to limitations of the involved cognitive resources, intuitive judgments about knowledge ascriptions are generated by processing only a limited part of the available information—the part that is in focus. According to the epistemic focal bias account, the intuitive judgments about knowledge ascriptions that constitute contrast effects amount to false positives, whereas the intuitive judgments that constitute salient alternatives effects amount to false negatives. I conclude by considering how the basic epistemic focal bias account may be developed further by reference to relevant alternatives theory in epistemology, pragmatics in the philosophy of language, and dual process theory in cognitive psychology. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|