A Proof-Based Account of Legal Exceptions.
I propose and defend a proof-based account of legal exceptions. The basic thought is that the characteristic behaviour of exceptions is to be explained in terms of the distinction, relative to some given decision-type C in some decision-making context, between two classes of relevant facts: those th...
| Publicado en: | Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 33; no. 1; pp. 133 - 169 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Spring2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=85919382&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 85919382 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01436503 BJ4 jtl: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies issn: 01436503 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Spring2013 vid: 33 iid: 1 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 85919382 10.1093/ojls/gqs024 ppf: 133 ppct: 36 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 249KB tig: atl: A Proof-Based Account of Legal Exceptions. aug: au: Duarte d’Almeida, Luís su: Exceptions (Law) Judicial process Legal evidence Courts Legal judgments Jurisprudence Hart, H. L. A. (Herbert Lionel Adolphus), 1907-1992 sug: subj: Exceptions (Law) Judicial process Legal evidence Courts Legal judgments Jurisprudence Hart, H. L. A. (Herbert Lionel Adolphus), 1907-1992 keyword: defences and defeaters exceptions HLA Hart legal proof ab: I propose and defend a proof-based account of legal exceptions. The basic thought is that the characteristic behaviour of exceptions is to be explained in terms of the distinction, relative to some given decision-type C in some decision-making context, between two classes of relevant facts: those that may, and those that may not, remain uncertain if a token decision C is to count as correctly made. The former is the class of exceptions. A fact F is an exception relative to some decision-type C, I claim, if (i) the ascertainment of F is sufficient for a token decision C not to count as correctly made, and (ii) the ascertainment of the negation of F is not necessary for a token decision C to count as correctly made. I also recuperate, reconstruct and discuss some of HLA Hart’s early views on defeasible judicial decisions. These two projects are closely connected: the latter is a vehicle for the former. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Oxford University Press. item: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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