The Engineering Thesis in Machine Consciousness.
I argue here that consciousness can be engineered. The claim that functional consciousness can be engineered has been persuasively put forth in regards to first-person functional consciousness; robots, for instance, can recognize colors, though there is still much debate about details of this sort o...
| Publicado en: | Techné: Research in Philosophy & Technology Vol. 16; no. 2; pp. 187 - 208 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Philosophy Documentation Center
Spring2012
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=86148871&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 86148871 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01617249 2Y0N jtl: Techné: Research in Philosophy & Technology issn: 01617249 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Spring2012 vid: 16 iid: 2 pid: 2411 pub: Philosophy Documentation Center artinfo: ui: 86148871 10.5840/techne201216214 ppf: 187 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 839KB tig: atl: The Engineering Thesis in Machine Consciousness. aug: au: Boltuc, Piotr affil: University of Illinois, Springfield su: Philosophy Consciousness Engineering Materialism Robotics sug: subj: Philosophy Consciousness Engineering Materialism Robotics keyword: h-consciousness machine consciousness non-reductive naturalism p-consciousness the engineering thesis the hard problem of consciousness ab: I argue here that consciousness can be engineered. The claim that functional consciousness can be engineered has been persuasively put forth in regards to first-person functional consciousness; robots, for instance, can recognize colors, though there is still much debate about details of this sort of consciousness. Such consciousness has now become one of the meanings of the term phenomenal consciousness (e.g., as used by Franklin and Baars). Yet, we extend the argument beyond the tradition of behaviorist or functional reductive views on consciousness that still predominate within cognitive science. If Nagel-Chalmers-Block-style non-reductive naturalism about first-person consciousness (h-consciousness) holds true, then, eventually we should be able to understand how such consciousness operates and how it gets produced (this is not the same as bridging the explanatory gap or solving Chalmers's hard problem of consciousness). If so, the consciousness it involves can in principle be engineered. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Techné: Research in Philosophy & Technology is the property of Philosophy Documentation Center and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Techné: Research in Philosophy & Technology holder: Philosophy Documentation Center dt: @attributes: year: 2012 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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