GEORGE'O DICKIE'O EKSTENSIONALISTINIO--INSTITUCINIO MENO APIBRĖŽIMO NEAPIBRĖŽTUMAS.

A major problem in contemporary analytic philosophy of art is whether and how it is possible to define art. The paper analyzes George Dickie's institutional definition of art. His response to anti-essentialists' arguments which deny the possibility to define art is presented. It is argued that Dicki...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Problems / Problemos Vol. 83; pp. 173 - 185
Autor principal: Straukaitė, Ieva
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Vilnius University 2013
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Descripción
Sumario:A major problem in contemporary analytic philosophy of art is whether and how it is possible to define art. The paper analyzes George Dickie's institutional definition of art. His response to anti-essentialists' arguments which deny the possibility to define art is presented. It is argued that Dickie attempts to substantiate his definition of art by invoking extensional methodology on the basis of which he construes the criteria for distinguishing between art and non-art as externalistic semantic, externalistic epistemic, and value-neutral. It is asserted that the institutional definition of art formulated by Dickie cannot be considered a definition of art as it is sustained by a logically vicious circle. Hence the conclusion that Dickie does not substantiate the possibility of a definition of art but introduces an extensional-institutional conception of art.
Šiuolaikinėje analitinėje meno filosofijoje viena pagrindinių problemų - ar įmanoma ir kaip įmanoma apibrėžti meną? Straipsnyje analizuojamas George'o Dickie'o institucinis meno apibrėžimas. Parodoma, kaip jis atsako į antiesencialistų argumentus, neigiančius meno apibrėžimo galimybę. Teigiama, kad meno apibrėžimą Dickie's įrodinėja pasitelkdamas ekstensionalistinę metodologiją, kuria remdamasis meno irne-meno atskyrimo kriterijus aiškina kaip semantinius eksternalistinius, episteminius eksterna-listinius ir normatyviai neutralius. Tvirtinama, kad Dickie'o suformuluotas institucinis meno apibrėžimas negali būti laikomas meno apibrėžimu, nes jis remiasi ydingo loginio rato principu. Iš to daroma išvada, kad Dickie's nepagrindžia meno apibrėžimo galimybės, bet pasiūlo ekstensionalistinę institucinę meno sampratą.