Idealisations in normative models.

In this paper I discuss the kinds of idealisations invoked in normative theories-logic, epistemology, and decision theory. I argue that very often the so-called norms of rationality are in fact mere idealisations invoked to make life easier. As such, these idealisations are not too different from va...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 190; no. 8; pp. 1337 - 1351
Autor principal: Colyvan, Mark
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature May2013
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=86406456&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 86406456
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00397857
        4LI
      jtl: Synthese
      issn: 00397857
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: May2013
      vid: 190
      iid: 8
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        86406456
        10.1007/s11229-012-0166-z
      ppf: 1337
      ppct: 14
      formats:
        fmt:
          @attributes:
            type: P
            size: 171KB
      tig:
        atl: Idealisations in normative models.
      aug:
        au: Colyvan, Mark
        affil: Sydney Centre for the Foundations of Science, University of Sydney, A14 Main Quadrangle Sydney Australia
      su:
        Normative theory (Communication)
        Theory of knowledge
        Normativity (Ethics)
        Decision theory
        Reasoning
      sug:
        subj:
          Normative theory (Communication)
          Theory of knowledge
          Normativity (Ethics)
          Decision theory
          Reasoning
      keyword:
        Formal epistemology
        Idealisations
        Normativity
      ab: In this paper I discuss the kinds of idealisations invoked in normative theories-logic, epistemology, and decision theory. I argue that very often the so-called norms of rationality are in fact mere idealisations invoked to make life easier. As such, these idealisations are not too different from various idealisations employed in scientific modelling. Examples of the latter include: fluids are incompressible (in fluid mechanics), growth rates are constant (in population ecology), and the gravitational influence of distant bodies can be ignored (in celestial mechanics). Thinking of logic, epistemology, and decision theory as normative models employing various idealisations of these kinds, changes the way we approach the justification of the models in question.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2013. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Synthese
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2013
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N