You better play 7: mutual versus common knowledge of advice in a weak-link experiment.
This paper presents the results of an experiment on mutual versus common knowledge of advice in a two-player weak-link game with random matching. Our experimental subjects play in pairs for thirteen rounds. After a brief learning phase common to all treatments, we vary the knowledge levels associate...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 190; no. 8; pp. 1351 - 1382 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
May2013
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=86406457&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 86406457 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2013 vid: 190 iid: 8 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 86406457 10.1007/s11229-012-0177-9 ppf: 1351 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 1MB tig: atl: You better play 7: mutual versus common knowledge of advice in a weak-link experiment. aug: au: Devetag, Giovanna Hosni, Hykel Sillari, Giacomo affil: University of Perugia, Via Pascoli 20 06123 Perugia Italy Scuola Normale Superiore, Piazza dei Cavalieri 7 56100 Pisa Italy su: Coordination games (Mathematics) Experimental philosophy Epistemic logic Theory of knowledge Game theory sug: subj: Coordination games (Mathematics) Experimental philosophy Epistemic logic Theory of knowledge Game theory keyword: Conventions Coordination games Epistemic attitudes Weak-link game ab: This paper presents the results of an experiment on mutual versus common knowledge of advice in a two-player weak-link game with random matching. Our experimental subjects play in pairs for thirteen rounds. After a brief learning phase common to all treatments, we vary the knowledge levels associated with external advice given in the form of a suggestion to pick the strategy supporting the payoff-dominant equilibrium. Our results are somewhat surprising and can be summarized as follows: in all our treatments both the choice of the efficiency-inducing action and the percentage of efficient equilibrium play are higher with respect to the control treatment, revealing that even a condition as weak as mutual knowledge of level 1 is sufficient to significantly increase the salience of the efficient equilibrium with respect to the absence of advice. Furthermore, and contrary to our hypothesis, mutual knowledge of level 2 induces, under suitable conditions, successful coordination more frequently than common knowledge. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2013. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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