The new Tweety puzzle: arguments against monistic Bayesian approaches in epistemology and cognitive science.
In this paper we discuss the new Tweety puzzle. The original Tweety puzzle was addressed by approaches in non-monotonic logic, which aim to adequately represent the Tweety case, namely that Tweety is a penguin and, thus, an exceptional bird, which cannot fly, although in general birds can fly. The n...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 190; no. 8; pp. 1407 - 1436 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
May2013
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=86406458&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 86406458 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2013 vid: 190 iid: 8 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 86406458 10.1007/s11229-012-0159-y ppf: 1407 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 337KB tig: atl: The new Tweety puzzle: arguments against monistic Bayesian approaches in epistemology and cognitive science. aug: au: Unterhuber, Matthias Schurz, Gerhard affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Duesseldorf, 40225 Duesseldorf Germany su: Theory of knowledge Bayes' theorem Probability theory Probabilism Cognitive science sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Bayes' theorem Probability theory Probabilism Cognitive science keyword: Bayesian rationality Conditional inference Frequency Monistic Bayesianism MP-MT asymmetry New Tweety puzzle Oaksford and Chater Objective Bayesianism Probability ab: In this paper we discuss the new Tweety puzzle. The original Tweety puzzle was addressed by approaches in non-monotonic logic, which aim to adequately represent the Tweety case, namely that Tweety is a penguin and, thus, an exceptional bird, which cannot fly, although in general birds can fly. The new Tweety puzzle is intended as a challenge for probabilistic theories of epistemic states. In the first part of the paper we argue against monistic Bayesians, who assume that epistemic states can at any given time be adequately described by a single subjective probability function. We show that monistic Bayesians cannot provide an adequate solution to the new Tweety puzzle, because this requires one to refer to a frequency-based probability function. We conclude that monistic Bayesianism cannot be a fully adequate theory of epistemic states. In the second part we describe an empirical study, which provides support for the thesis that monistic Bayesianism is also inadequate as a descriptive theory of cognitive states. In the final part of the paper we criticize Bayesian approaches in cognitive science, insofar as their monistic tendency cannot adequately address the new Tweety puzzle. We, further, argue against monistic Bayesianism in cognitive science by means of a case study. In this case study we show that Oaksford and Chater's (, ) model of conditional inference-contrary to the authors' theoretical position-has to refer also to a frequency-based probability function. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2013. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|