Democracy and scientific expertise: illusions of political and epistemic inclusion.
Realizing the ideal of democracy requires political inclusion for citizens. A legitimate democracy must give citizens the opportunity to express their attitudes about the relative attractions of different policies, and access to political mechanisms through which they can be counted and heard. Actua...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 190; no. 7; pp. 1267 - 1292 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=86406819&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 86406819 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2013 vid: 190 iid: 7 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 86406819 10.1007/s11229-012-0226-4 ppf: 1267 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 225KB tig: atl: Democracy and scientific expertise: illusions of political and epistemic inclusion. aug: au: Trout, J. affil: Department of Philosophy and Psychology, Loyola University Chicago, Chicago USA su: Legitimacy of governments Political stability Group decision making Virtue epistemology Paternalism United States. Congress. Senate sug: subj: Legitimacy of governments Political stability Group decision making Virtue epistemology Paternalism United States. Congress. Senate keyword: Ameliorative psychology Epistemic principle Group decision-making Inclusiveness Judgment Legitimacy Policy ab: Realizing the ideal of democracy requires political inclusion for citizens. A legitimate democracy must give citizens the opportunity to express their attitudes about the relative attractions of different policies, and access to political mechanisms through which they can be counted and heard. Actual governance often aims not at accurate belief, but at nonepistemic factors like achieving and maintaining institutional stability, creating the feeling of government legitimacy among citizens, or managing access to influence on policy decision-making. I examine the traditional relationship between inclusiveness and accuracy, and illustrate this connection by discussing empirical work on how group decision-making can improve accuracy. I also advance a Generic Epistemic Principle that any evidence-based decision-making procedures must embrace. Focusing on policy-making, I then measure the distance between these standards and the ones actually implemented in U.S. political settings. Psychological research on individual and group decision-making is a source of normative assessment for existing policy judgment, but it neither rationalizes nor legitimates the actual and typical processes used in U.S. institutions of political decision making. To establish this point, I focus on one characteristic government institution-the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Space, and Technology-that displays deliberative processes at odds with the sciences they advocate, and with the Generic Epistemic Principle. I explain this discouraging condition in terms of several inveterate factors in U.S. politics: a limitlessly money-driven and endless campaigning process that effectively forces elected representatives to align themselves with money and vote strategically, the use of procedural arrangements known to make people feel politically included when they are not, and the unresponsiveness of a majoritarian (vs. consensus) democracy. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2013. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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