Self-consciousness and nonconceptual content.
Self-consciousness can be defined as the ability to think 'I'-thoughts. Recently, it has been suggested that self-consciousness in this sense can (and should) be accounted for in terms of nonconceptual forms of self-representation. Here, I will argue that while theories of nonconceptual self-conscio...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 163; no. 3; pp. 649 - 673 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=86468440&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 86468440 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2013 vid: 163 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 86468440 10.1007/s11098-011-9837-8 ppf: 649 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 242KB tig: atl: Self-consciousness and nonconceptual content. aug: au: Musholt, Kristina affil: Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street London WC2A 2AE UK su: Self-consciousness (Awareness) Consciousness Representation (Philosophy) Autopoiesis Sensory perception sug: subj: Self-consciousness (Awareness) Consciousness Representation (Philosophy) Autopoiesis Sensory perception keyword: Explicit Immunity to error through misidentification Implicit Nonconceptual content Perception Proprioception Representation Self-consciousness Self-reference Unarticulated constituents ab: Self-consciousness can be defined as the ability to think 'I'-thoughts. Recently, it has been suggested that self-consciousness in this sense can (and should) be accounted for in terms of nonconceptual forms of self-representation. Here, I will argue that while theories of nonconceptual self-consciousness do provide us with important insights regarding the essential genetic and epistemic features of self-conscious thought, they can only deliver part of the full story that is required to understand the phenomenon of self-consciousness. I will provide two arguments to this effect, drawing on insights from the philosophy of language and on structural differences between conceptual and nonconceptual forms of representation. Both arguments rest on the intuition that while self-consciousness requires explicit self-representation, nonconceptual content can at best provide implicit self-related information. I will conclude that in order to explain the emergence of self-conscious thought out of more basic forms of representation one has to explain the transition between implicit self-related information and explicit self-representation. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2013. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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