The Problem with Uniform Solutions to Peer Disagreement.
Contributors to the recent disagreement debate have sought to provide a uniform response to cases in which epistemic peers disagree about the epistemic import of a shared body of evidence, no matter what kind of evidence they are disagreeing about. The varied cases addressed in the literature have i...
| Publicado en: | Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy Vol. 79; no. 2; pp. 96 - 127 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
May2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=86641919&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 86641919 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00405825 HL0 jtl: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy issn: 00405825 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: May2013 vid: 79 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 86641919 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2012.01149.x ppf: 96 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 200KB tig: atl: The Problem with Uniform Solutions to Peer Disagreement. aug: au: Konigsberg, Amir affil: Hebrew University of Jerusalem su: Acquiescence (Psychology) Philosophy Weather forecasting Ethics Belief & doubt sug: subj: Acquiescence (Psychology) Philosophy Weather forecasting Ethics Belief & doubt keyword: disagreement epistemic conciliation the equal weight view ab: Contributors to the recent disagreement debate have sought to provide a uniform response to cases in which epistemic peers disagree about the epistemic import of a shared body of evidence, no matter what kind of evidence they are disagreeing about. The varied cases addressed in the literature have included examples of disagreement about restaurant bills, court verdicts, weather forecasting, chess, morality, religious beliefs, and even disagreements about philosophical disagreements. The equal treatment of these varied cases has motivated the search for a uniform response to peer disagreement wherever it is encountered. In this article I challenge this prevalent approach in the literature. I grant the notion of epistemic peer and accept that being a peer may amount to the same thing in different domains; nonetheless I contend that different domains appear to call for different responses to disagreement. I argue that the appropriate response to finding out about a disagreement with a peer is different in different domains. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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