Internal control system, earnings quality, and the dynamics of financial reporting.
Using an earnings management model in which managers manipulate information when the firm's control system fails, I introduce a measure of earnings quality, based on the notion of integral precision, that has solid theoretical foundations. A trade-off between the frequency and the magnitude of overs...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 44; no. 1; pp. 145 - 168 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Spring2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=86691322&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 86691322 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Spring2013 vid: 44 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 86691322 10.1111/1756-2171.12015 ppf: 145 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 753KB tig: atl: Internal control system, earnings quality, and the dynamics of financial reporting. aug: au: Marinovic, Iván affil: Stanford University su: Wages Business enterprises Contactor control systems Financial statements Stock prices sug: subj: Wages Business enterprises Contactor control systems Financial statements Stock prices ab: Using an earnings management model in which managers manipulate information when the firm's control system fails, I introduce a measure of earnings quality, based on the notion of integral precision, that has solid theoretical foundations. A trade-off between the frequency and the magnitude of overstatements is shown: overstatements are larger when misreporting is less likely. Overall, the model generates a distribution of earnings announcements similar to its empirical analogue and provides a structural method to identify the likelihood and magnitude of misreporting by exploiting information from the moments of the distribution of reported earnings. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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