The Argument for Subject-Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity.
The article offers the author's insight on the arguments from reflections on personal identity of subject-body dualism by Martine Nida-Rümelin (NR). He states that NR rejects the four-dimensionalism of subjects of experience in subject-body dualism. He says that in reductive materialism, a materiali...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 86; no. 3; pp. 684 - 702 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
May2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | The article offers the author's insight on the arguments from reflections on personal identity of subject-body dualism by Martine Nida-Rümelin (NR). He states that NR rejects the four-dimensionalism of subjects of experience in subject-body dualism. He says that in reductive materialism, a materialist should reject the view that material objects have empirical criteria for transtemporal identity. |
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