COOPERATION SPILLOVERS AND PRICE COMPETITION IN EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS.
Firms often cooperate explicitly through activities such as research joint ventures, while competing in other markets. Cooperation in research and development can allow firms to internalize the external benefits of knowledge creation and increase the returns from research and development (R&D) expen...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 51; no. 3; pp. 1715 - 1731 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=87447418&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 87447418 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2013 vid: 51 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 87447418 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2012.00486.x ppf: 1715 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 684KB tig: atl: COOPERATION SPILLOVERS AND PRICE COMPETITION IN EXPERIMENTAL MARKETS. aug: au: CASON, TIMOTHY N. GANGADHARAN, LATA affil: Cason: DepartmENt of Economics, Purdue University, 100 S. Grant Street, West Lafayette, IN 47907 ‐ 2076. Phone 765 ‐ 494 ‐ 1737, Fax 765 ‐ 494 ‐ 9658, E ‐ mail Gangadharan: DepartmENt of Economics, Monash University, Clayton Campus, Victoria, Australia. Phone +61 3 9905 2345, Fax +61 3 9905 5476, E ‐ mail su: Externalities Cooperation Markets Economic competition Economics Joint ventures Research & development sug: subj: Externalities Cooperation Markets Economic competition Economics Research and Development in the Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences (except Biotechnology) Research and Development in Biotechnology Joint ventures Research & development ab: Firms often cooperate explicitly through activities such as research joint ventures, while competing in other markets. Cooperation in research and development can allow firms to internalize the external benefits of knowledge creation and increase the returns from research and development (R&D) expenditures. Such cooperation may spill over to facilitate collusion in the market, however, potentially lowering welfare and efficiency. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to examine if sellers successfully coordinate to fund a joint research project to reduce their costs, and how this collaboration affects their pricing behavior. The experiment includes control treatments with separate R&D cooperation and markets. Our results show that although participants usually cooperate when given an opportunity, cooperation is observed less frequently when they also compete in the market. Communication improves cooperation in all environments, particularly when the market is present. Nevertheless, the data provide no evidence of seller collusion in the market. ( JEL D43, D71, H40, O3) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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