A Confrontation of Convergent Realism.
For many years--and with some energy since Laudan's "Confutation of Convergent Realism" (1981)--the scientific realist has sought to accommodate examples of false- yet-successful theories in the history of science. One of the most prominent strategies is to identify 'success fueling' components of f...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 80; no. 2; pp. 189 - 212 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Cambridge University Press
Apr2013
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=87745345&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 87745345 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2013 vid: 80 iid: 2 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 87745345 10.1086/670297 ppf: 189 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 766KB tig: atl: A Confrontation of Convergent Realism. aug: au: Vickers, Peter su: History of science Philosophy of science Realism Empiricism Laudan, Larry sug: subj: History of science Philosophy of science Realism Empiricism Laudan, Larry ab: For many years--and with some energy since Laudan's "Confutation of Convergent Realism" (1981)--the scientific realist has sought to accommodate examples of false- yet-successful theories in the history of science. One of the most prominent strategies is to identify 'success fueling' components of false theories that themselves are at least approximately true (judging by our current understanding). In this article I develop both sides of the debate, introducing new challenges from the history of science as well as suggesting adjustments to the divide et impera realist strategy. A new 'recipe' for the prospective identi?cation of (at least some) working/idle posits is considered. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|