Defending Moral Realism from Empirical Evidence of Disagreement.
Recently, empirically minded philosophers have employed evidence of widespread, fundamental moral disagreement to argue against moral realism. I argue that the empirical evidence does not refute realism because the disagreement is consistent with certain pluralistic versions of moral realism that po...
| Published in: | Social Theory & Practice Vol. 39; no. 3; pp. 393 - 417 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Florida State University
Jul2013
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=88776826&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 88776826 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 0037802X STP jtl: Social Theory & Practice issn: 0037802X maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2013 vid: 39 iid: 3 pid: 150 pub: Florida State University artinfo: ui: 88776826 10.5840/soctheorpract201339322 ppf: 393 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 244KB tig: atl: Defending Moral Realism from Empirical Evidence of Disagreement. aug: au: Meyers, C. D. affil: Department of Philosophy and Religion, University of Southern Mississippi su: Mackie, J. L. Moral psychology Pluralism Social psychology Moral realism sug: subj: Moral psychology Pluralism Social psychology Moral realism Mackie, J. L. keyword: disagreement empirical philosophy J.L. Mackie moral psychology moral realism pluralism W.D. Ross disagreement empirical philosophy J.L. Mackie moral psychology moral realism pluralism W.D. Ross ab: Recently, empirically minded philosophers have employed evidence of widespread, fundamental moral disagreement to argue against moral realism. I argue that the empirical evidence does not refute realism because the disagreement is consistent with certain pluralistic versions of moral realism that posit a set of pro tanto normative principles. Others have appealed to pluralism in defense of moral realism but have used pluralism to attack the empirically based approach to ethical theory. Although I argue that the empirical argument against moral realism fails, I defend the approach and suggest better ways that (pluralist) moral realism could be tested empirically. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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