The information effect: constructive memory, testimony, and epistemic luck.
The incorporation of post-event testimonial information into an agent's memory representation of the event via constructive memory processes gives rise to the misinformation effect, in which the incorporation of inaccurate testimonial information results in the formation of a false memory belief. Wh...
| Published in: | Synthese Vol. 190; no. 12; pp. 2429 - 2457 |
|---|---|
| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Springer Nature
Aug2013
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=88784617&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 88784617 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2013 vid: 190 iid: 12 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 88784617 10.1007/s11229-011-9992-7 ppf: 2429 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 349KB tig: atl: The information effect: constructive memory, testimony, and epistemic luck. aug: au: Michaelian, Kourken affil: Department of Philosophy, Bilkent University, Bilkent, Ankara 06800 Turkey su: Testimony (Theory of knowledge) Theory of knowledge Fortune Fortune-telling Memory sug: subj: Testimony (Theory of knowledge) Theory of knowledge Fortune Fortune-telling Memory keyword: Constructive memory Epistemic luck Eyewitness memory Misinformation effect Testimony ab: The incorporation of post-event testimonial information into an agent's memory representation of the event via constructive memory processes gives rise to the misinformation effect, in which the incorporation of inaccurate testimonial information results in the formation of a false memory belief. While psychological research has focussed primarily on the incorporation of inaccurate information, the incorporation of accurate information raises a particularly interesting epistemological question: do the resulting memory beliefs qualify as knowledge? It is intuitively plausible that they do not, for they appear to be only luckily true. I argue, however, that, despite its intuitive plausibility, this view is mistaken: once we adopt an adequate (modal) conception of epistemic luck and an adequate (adaptive) general approach to memory, it becomes clear that memory beliefs resulting from the incorporation of accurate testimonial information are not in general luckily true. I conclude by sketching some implications of this argument for the psychology of memory, suggesting that the misinformation effect would better be investigated in the context of a broader 'information effect'. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2013. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|