Semantics, conceptual spaces, and the meeting of minds.
We present an account of semantics that is not construed as a mapping of language to the world but rather as a mapping between individual meaning spaces. The meanings of linguistic entities are established via a 'meeting of minds.' The concepts in the minds of communicating individuals are modeled a...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 190; no. 12; pp. 2165 - 2194 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Aug2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=88784631&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 88784631 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2013 vid: 190 iid: 12 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 88784631 10.1007/s11229-011-9963-z ppf: 2165 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 642KB tig: atl: Semantics, conceptual spaces, and the meeting of minds. aug: au: Warglien, Massimo Gärdenfors, Peter affil: Department of Philosophy, 22100 Lund Sweden su: Semantics research Comparative linguistics Space Metaphysics Thought & thinking sug: subj: Semantics research Comparative linguistics Space Metaphysics Thought & thinking keyword: Cognitive semantics Compositionality Conceptual spaces Fixpoint semantics Meeting of minds ab: We present an account of semantics that is not construed as a mapping of language to the world but rather as a mapping between individual meaning spaces. The meanings of linguistic entities are established via a 'meeting of minds.' The concepts in the minds of communicating individuals are modeled as convex regions in conceptual spaces. We outline a mathematical framework, based on fixpoints in continuous mappings between conceptual spaces, that can be used to model such a semantics. If concepts are convex, it will in general be possible for interactors to agree on joint meaning even if they start out from different representational spaces. Language is discrete, while mental representations tend to be continuous-posing a seeming paradox. We show that the convexity assumption allows us to address this problem. Using examples, we further show that our approach helps explain the semantic processes involved in the composition of expressions. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2013. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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