Color and cognitive penetrability.
Several psychological experiments have suggested that concepts can influence perceived color (e.g., Delk and Fillenbaum in Am J Psychol 78(2):290-293, , Hansen et al. in Nat Neurosci 9(11):1367-1368, , Olkkonen et al. in J Vis 8(5):1-16, ). Observers tend to assign typical colors to objects even whe...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 165; no. 1; pp. 167 - 176 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Aug2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=89093730&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 89093730 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2013 vid: 165 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 89093730 10.1007/s11098-012-9928-1 ppf: 167 ppct: 9 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 143KB tig: atl: Color and cognitive penetrability. aug: au: Zeimbekis, John su: Judgment (Psychology) Color Arabic poetry Interpretation (Philosophy) Philosophy Elegiac poetry sug: subj: Judgment (Psychology) Color Arabic poetry Interpretation (Philosophy) Philosophy Elegiac poetry keyword: Borderline judgments Cognitive penetrability Perceptual judgments Vagueness ab: Several psychological experiments have suggested that concepts can influence perceived color (e.g., Delk and Fillenbaum in Am J Psychol 78(2):290-293, , Hansen et al. in Nat Neurosci 9(11):1367-1368, , Olkkonen et al. in J Vis 8(5):1-16, ). Observers tend to assign typical colors to objects even when the objects do not have those colors. Recently, these findings were used to argue that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable (Macpherson ). This interpretation of the experiments has far-reaching consequences: it implies that the way we think of objects determines how we see them, thus threatening the role of perception in justifying beliefs. In this paper, I show that the psychological findings can be accounted for without admitting cognitive penetrability. An underestimated but key feature of the experiments is that observers had to judge colors in borderline cases, in conditions of reduced acuity, or on the basis of color-concepts instead of matching. Such judgments are sensitive to the form of bias that Tversky and Kahneman (Science 185:1124-1131, ) have termed 'anchoring'. Adopting a suggestion from Raffman (Philos Rev 103(1):41-74, ), I argue that the way subjects in the experiments think of the objects could affect their color judgments without altering their color experiences. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2013. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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