Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information.
Trade liberalization under GATTA/World Trade Organization (WTO) has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection, possibly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping. This article investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetri...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 80; no. 1; pp. 81 - 106 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=89440147&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 89440147 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2013 vid: 80 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 89440147 10.4284/0038-4038-2010.028 ppf: 81 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 16.9MB tig: atl: Antidumping as Strategic Trade Policy under Asymmetric Information. aug: au: Matschke, Xenia Schöttner, Anja affil: Fachbereich IV-VWL, Universität Trier and CESifo, Universitätsring 15, 54296 Trier, Germany Department of Economics, University of Konstanz, PO-Box 144, 78457 Konstanz, Germany su: World Trade Organization Unfair competition Trade regulation Dumping (International trade) Free trade sug: subj: Unfair competition Trade regulation World Trade Organization Dumping (International trade) Free trade ab: Trade liberalization under GATTA/World Trade Organization (WTO) has been partly offset by an increase in antidumping protection, possibly due to the inclusion of sales below cost in the definition of dumping. This article investigates the domestic government's antidumping duty choice in an asymmetric information framework, in which the foreign firm's cost is observed by the domestic firm, but not by the government. We show that by designing a tariff schedule contingent on firms' cost reports and accompanied by a threat to collect additional information for report verification, the domestic government may not only be able to extract the true cost information, but also succeed in implementing the full-information, governmental welfare-maximizing duty. The antidumping framework within GATT/WTO may thus not only offer the means to pursue strategic trade policy disguised as fair trade policy, but it also helps overcome informational problems with regard to correctly determining the optimal strategic trade policy. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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