Promoting Value As Such.
Without needing to commit to any specific claims about what states of affairs have most agent-neutral value, we can nevertheless predict that states of affairs which are relatively valuable are also relatively likely to occur-on the grounds that, all else equal, at least some other agents are likely...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 87; no. 2; pp. 392 - 417 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=90081689&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 90081689 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2013 vid: 87 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 90081689 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2012.00601.x ppf: 392 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 145KB tig: atl: Promoting Value As Such. aug: au: Williams, Evan G. affil: Purdue University su: Justification (Ethics) Phenomenology Philosophy of mind Theory of knowledge Decision making sug: subj: Justification (Ethics) Phenomenology Philosophy of mind Theory of knowledge Decision making ab: Without needing to commit to any specific claims about what states of affairs have most agent-neutral value, we can nevertheless predict that states of affairs which are relatively valuable are also relatively likely to occur-on the grounds that, all else equal, at least some other agents are likely to recognize the value of those states of affairs, pursue them because they are valuable, and successfully bring them about as a consequence of that pursuit. This gives us a way to promote value as such, rather than promoting it under some more tendentious description. We can predict that actions which help other people-or our own future selves-to recognize valuable states of affairs, actions which motivate them to pursue whatever states of affairs they believe to be valuable, or actions which help them succeed at their pursuits will, all else equal, have positive consequences. So we have a pro tanto reason to take such actions, and the subjective justification of that reason is independent of other moral claims. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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