On the Moral Agency of Computers.
Can computer systems ever be considered moral agents? This paper considers two factors that are explored in the recent philosophical literature. First, there are the important domains in which computers are allowed to act, made possible by their greater functional capacities. Second, there is the cl...
| Publicado en: | Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 32; no. 2; pp. 227 - 237 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=90309796&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 90309796 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01677411 NM2 jtl: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy issn: 01677411 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2013 vid: 32 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 90309796 10.1007/s11245-012-9149-4 ppf: 227 ppct: 10 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 181KB tig: atl: On the Moral Agency of Computers. aug: au: Powers, Thomas su: Computer ethics Moral agent (Philosophy) Philosophical literature Voice recognition software Artificial intelligence Proprioception sug: subj: Computer ethics Moral agent (Philosophy) Philosophical literature Voice recognition software Artificial intelligence Proprioception keyword: Machine ethics Moral agency ab: Can computer systems ever be considered moral agents? This paper considers two factors that are explored in the recent philosophical literature. First, there are the important domains in which computers are allowed to act, made possible by their greater functional capacities. Second, there is the claim that these functional capacities appear to embody relevant human abilities, such as autonomy and responsibility. I argue that neither the first ( Doman- Function) factor nor the second ( Simulacrum) factor gets at the central issue in the case for computer moral agency: whether they can have the kinds of intentional states that cause their decisions and actions. I give an account that builds on traditional action theory and allows us to conceive of computers as genuine moral agents in virtue of their own causally efficacious intentional states. These states can cause harm or benefit to moral patients, but do not depend on computer consciousness or intelligence. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2013. All Rights Reserved. item: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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