Ignoring Spillover Effects of Airport Regulation.
Theoretical standard models and regulatory actions often ignore that firms are competing with other firms in related markets. In these contexts, cross-price relationships should be taken into account. The usual instinct with muitiproduct firms would be to use Ramsey prices to find optimal markups. H...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Transport Economics & Policy Vol. 47; no. 3; pp. 387 - 398 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Liverpool University Press / Journals
Sep2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=90455136&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 90455136 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00225258 JTY jtl: Journal of Transport Economics & Policy issn: 00225258 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2013 vid: 47 iid: 3 pid: 1623 pub: Liverpool University Press / Journals artinfo: ui: 90455136 ppf: 387 ppct: 11 formats: tig: atl: Ignoring Spillover Effects of Airport Regulation. aug: au: Alves, Carlos Barbot, Cristina affil: CEF.UP, Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto, Rua Dr. Roberto Frias, 4200-464 Porto, Portugal su: Competitive advantage in business Antitrust law Price regulation Elasticity (Economics) Demand function sug: subj: Competitive advantage in business Antitrust law Price regulation Elasticity (Economics) Demand function ab: Theoretical standard models and regulatory actions often ignore that firms are competing with other firms in related markets. In these contexts, cross-price relationships should be taken into account. The usual instinct with muitiproduct firms would be to use Ramsey prices to find optimal markups. However, this is only applicable in situations with independent demand functions. Literature mostly covers cases where the regulated firm is a natural monopoly and therefore faces a budget constraint. This paper aims to provide conditions under which optimal price caps are set whenever there are related markets and the regulated firm is not a natural monopoly. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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