Privacy and Punishment.
Philosophers have focused on why privacy is of value to innocent people with nothing to hide. I argue that for people who do have something to hide, such as a past crime or bad behavior in a public place, informational privacy can be important for avoiding undeserved or disproportionate nonlegal pun...
| Publicado en: | Social Theory & Practice Vol. 39; no. 4; pp. 643 - 669 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Florida State University
Oct2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
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