Climate treaties and approaching catastrophes.
Abstract: If the threshold that triggers climate catastrophe is known with certainty, and the benefits of avoiding catastrophe are high relative to the costs, treaties can easily coordinate countries' behavior so as to avoid the threshold. Where the net benefits of avoiding catastrophe are lower, tr...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Environmental Economics & Management Vol. 66; no. 2; pp. 235 - 251 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Academic Press Inc.
Sep2013
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=90586033&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 90586033 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00950696 EEM jtl: Journal of Environmental Economics & Management issn: 00950696 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2013 vid: 66 iid: 2 pid: 735 pub: Academic Press Inc. artinfo: ui: 90586033 10.1016/j.jeem.2012.12.004 ppf: 235 ppct: 16 formats: tig: atl: Climate treaties and approaching catastrophes. aug: au: Barrett, Scott affil: School of International and Public Affairs & Earth Institute, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027, United States Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ 08544, United States su: Emergency management Environmental economics Uncertainty Catastrophism Emission control Probability density function sug: subj: Emergency management Environmental economics Uncertainty Other federal protective services Other provincial protective services Other municipal protective services Emergency and Other Relief Services Other Justice, Public Order, and Safety Activities Catastrophism Emission control Probability density function keyword: Catastrophe Climate change Cooperation Coordination Enforcement International environmental agreements Catastrophe Climate change Cooperation Coordination Enforcement International environmental agreements ab: Abstract: If the threshold that triggers climate catastrophe is known with certainty, and the benefits of avoiding catastrophe are high relative to the costs, treaties can easily coordinate countries' behavior so as to avoid the threshold. Where the net benefits of avoiding catastrophe are lower, treaties typically fail to help countries cooperate to avoid catastrophe, sustaining only modest cuts in emissions. These results are unaffected by uncertainty about the impact of catastrophe. By contrast, uncertainty about the catastrophic threshold normally causes coordination to collapse. Whether the probability density function has “thin” or “fat” tails makes little difference. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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