The Structure of Utility in Spatial Models of Voting.
Empirical models of spatial voting allow legislators' locations in a policy or ideological space to be inferred from their roll-call votes. These are typically random utility models where the features of the utility functions other than the ideal points are assumed rather than estimated. In this art...
| Publicado en: | American Journal of Political Science (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) Vol. 57; no. 4; pp. 1008 - 1029 |
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| Autores principales: | , , , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
John Wiley & Sons, Inc.
Oct2013
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=90607816&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 90607816 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00925853 LVDV jtl: American Journal of Political Science (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.) issn: 00925853 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2013 vid: 57 iid: 4 pid: 52269 pub: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. artinfo: ui: 90607816 10.1111/ajps.12029 ppf: 1008 ppct: 21 formats: tig: atl: The Structure of Utility in Spatial Models of Voting. aug: au: Carroll, Royce Lewis, Jeffrey B. Lo, James Poole, Keith T. Rosenthal, Howard affil: Rice University University of California, Los Angeles University of Mannheim University of Georgia New York University su: Voting research Gaussian function Voting Political science Legislative voting Scalia, Antonin, 1936-2016 Kennedy, Anthony M., 1936- Agenda setting theory (Communication) United States. Congress United States. Supreme Court sug: subj: Voting research Gaussian function Voting Political science Legislative voting Scalia, Antonin, 1936-2016 Kennedy, Anthony M., 1936- Agenda setting theory (Communication) United States. Congress United States. Supreme Court ab: Empirical models of spatial voting allow legislators' locations in a policy or ideological space to be inferred from their roll-call votes. These are typically random utility models where the features of the utility functions other than the ideal points are assumed rather than estimated. In this article, we first consider a model in which legislators' utility functions are allowed to be a mixture of the two most commonly assumed utility functions: the quadratic function and the Gaussian function assumed by NOMINATE. Across many roll-call data sets, we find that legislators' utility functions are estimated to be very nearly Gaussian. We then relax the usual assumption that each legislator is equally sensitive to policy change and find that extreme legislators are generally more sensitive to policy change than their more centrally located counterparts. This result suggests that extremists are more ideologically rigid while moderates are more likely to consider influences that arise outside liberal-conservative conflict. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 2013 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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